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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SULTANATE OF OMAN
Ellen Kerrigan Dry
I. Introduction
While the United States' capital market has had its headline-grabbing
scandals involving companies such as World Com and Enron, the capital
market in the Sultanate of Oman (Oman) has also experienced its share of
corporate troubles affecting not only large Omani companies such as
National Rice Mills SAOG1 and Oman National Investment Company
Holding SAOG,2 but also dozens of smaller companies, which have had to
turn to the government for assistance. Over the years, there have been
charges that companies "hide information," 4 have poor internal controls5 and
have negligent,6 incompetent and "bungling" boards of directors.7 In some
instances there have been claims of fraud on the part of directors. 8 Company
mismanagement and ineffective boards of directors share much of the blame
for the sharp drop in share prices occurring in 1998 and the ensuing loss of
investor confidence. 9 All of which have underscored the need for higher
corporate governance standards.
1 Palazhi Ashok Kumar, Related-Party Deals Wipe Out National Rice Mills
Networth (sic), TIMES OF OMAN, Mar. 24, 2002, at 12 [hereinafter , Related Party
Deals].
2 Palazhi Ashok Kumar, CM4 Suspends Trading in Onic Holding Shares, TIMES OF
OMAN, Feb. 14, 2001, at 9 [hereinafter, CMA Suspends Trading]; [Four] Jailed for
Breach of Trust andFraud, TIMES OF OMAN, May 8, 2001, at 1.
3 Palazhi Ashok Kumar, Revival Package for 50 Sick Firms Soon, TIMES OF OMAN,
May 12, 2001, at 1 [hereinafter, Revival Package].
4 CMA Suspends Trading, supra note 2, at 11; Palazhi Ashok Kumar, CM4 To
Introduce Fresh Disclosure Norms, TIMES OF OMAN, Jan. 29, 2001, at 11.
5 Related Party Deals, supra note 1, at 12.
6 Palazhi Ashok Kumar, Brokerages Seek Probe Into Alleged Post-Issue Fiascos,
TIMES OF OMAN, June 11, 2000, at 9 [hereinafter, Brokerages Seek Probe].
7 Palazhi Ashok Kumar, Companies May Have to Recast Boards, TIMES OF OMAN,
Jan. 2, 2002, at 7; Revival Package, supra note 3, at 1.
8 Brokerages Seek Probe, supra note 6, at 9; [Four] Jailed for Breach of Trust and
Fraud, supra note 2, at 1; see Shilpa Mathai, After the Crash, ARABIES TRENDS, Oct.
2000, at 60.
9 Revival Package, supra note 3, at 1; CM4 To Introduce Fresh Disclosure, supra
note 4, at 12; Companies May Have to Recast Boards, supra note 7, at 7; Brokerages
Seek Probe, supra note 6, at 9; Mathai, supra note 8, at 60.
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Since 1998, the Government of Oman has taken steps to address
many of the underlying issues that have led to the problems in its capital
market, such as lack of transparency and poor internal controls, conflicts of
interest, and confusion over the role and responsibilities of board members.
Most recently, in June and August 2002, respectively, the Capital Market
Authority (CMA) announced new corporate governance standards for
companies with securities listed on the Muscat Securities Market (MSM) 0
and Sultan Qaboos issued a Royal Decree amending the Commercial
Companies Law to improve companies' internal controls and encourage
independence of their boards."
This article will examine the development of Oman's capital market,
concentrating on the evolution of policies involving corporate governance of
companies listed on the MSM. The article summarizes and comments on
Oman's current position on corporate governance of publicly-traded
companies, including the role of the board of directors, conflicts of interest
and related party transactions, liability of directors, the role of the audit
committee and the internal and external auditors, disclosure and
transparency, and enforcement. In order to understand how and why
Oman's corporate regulatory environment developed as it has, a short
summary of Oman's history since 1970 is included. The article concludes
with comments on the current status of corporate governance in Oman and
suggestions that might be considered as the Government considers
amendments to the laws or implementing regulations involving the capital
markets, in order to improve corporate governance further.
II. Background
Oman opened the door to the modem world in 1970, the year Sultan
Qaboos bin Said assumed power. A country of 192,315 square miles located
on the southeast comer of the Arabian Peninsula, in 1970 Oman had six
miles of paved roads, and a native population of less than one million
10 Code of Corporate Governance for MSM Listed Companies, Circular No. 11/2002
(June 3, 2002) [hereinafter Code of Corporate Governance] available at
http://www.cma-oman.com. All references to laws, circulars and regulations in this
article, with the exception of references to the draft commercial companies law, note
54 infra, are to unofficial translations of the original Arabic text.
1 Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Commercial Companies Law No.
4/74, as amended by Royal Decree Nos. 53/82, 13/89, 83/94, 16/96, 39/98, and
77/02 (May 1997). References in this article to the Commercial Companies Law
refer to the Commercial Companies Law No. 4/74, prior to the enactment of Royal
Decree No. 77/02 [hereinafter 2002 CCL Amendments].
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people.' 2  Most Omanis were farmers, coastal traders or Bedouin, making
their living growing dates or as shopkeepers, fishermen, or camel herders.' 3
Few people had received formal education; in early 1971, Oman had three
primary schools and 30 teachers serving 909 boys. 14 Upon entering into
power Sultan Qaboos moved quickly to take the steps necessary to
modernize his country, from providing education to all children 5 to
establishing a legal framework for commercial development.16
In the 1970s, sole proprietorships and partnerships were the
dominant form of commercial enterprise. In 1974, with the promulgation of
the Commercial Companies Law, a legal mechanism existed for the creation
and operation of partnerships, joint ventures, joint stock companies, and
limited liability companies. 17 Even as enterprises incorporated, it was
unlikely that owners of those companies had the intention of selling shares to
the "public." Fourteen years after the Commercial Companies Law was
promulgated, in 1988, the MSM was established 8 and a year later began
operations with eleven companies listing Omani Rials (OR) 28,452,000
(S73,975,200) worth of securities.19
Following the establishment of the MSM, the Government of Oman
encouraged local companies to expand and issue securities to the public.
Then, as now, a large number of public companies were family-owned with
some public float or otherwise closely-held with a small minimum investor
12 MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, OMAN 2000, at 21, 156 (2000); NATIONAL
STATISTICAL DEPART'MENT, MLNISTRY OF DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPMENT IN OMAN
1970 - 1974,43(1975) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENT IN OMAN 1970 - 1974.].
13 See DEVELOPMENT IN OMAN, supra note 12, at 1, 17, 29, 35, 60; PETER VINE, THE
HERITAGE OF OMAN 215 (1995).14 DEVELOPMENT IN OMAN 1970 - 1974, supra note 12, at 66; VINE, supra note 13, at
115 (1995).
15 Within ten years, the number of students, both boys and girls, in Omani schools
rose to 122,143 and the number of teachers rose to 6745. VINE, supra note 13, at
116.
16 In 1974 alone, Sultan Qaboos promulgated the Commercial Companies Law,
supra note 11, the Commercial Registration Law No. 3/74, the Banking Law (Royal
Decree No. 7/74), and the Foreign Business and Investment Law (Royal Decree No.
4/74).17 Commercial Companies Law, supra note 11.
" Royal Decree No. 53/88, Muscat Securities Market Law.
19 Muscat Securities Market, MSM Statistics: December 2001, at 30, available at
www.msm.gov.om [hereinafter ASM Statistics]. By the end of the year, there were
83 companies listed and a total market capitalization of OR 414,700,000
(approximately S1 billion) (OR 1.000 equals U.S. S2.60). Id. at 36..
2003]
48 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol.3:1
float. 20 The Government of Oman owned some companies. Although the
owners may have been reluctant to take their companies public for fear of
losing control, the Commercial Companies Law offered protections to their
ownership rights. A company could "go public" and be listed on the MSM
while the founding shareholders maintained 60% of the shares.21 Substantial
shareholders (those holding 10% or more of the company's shares) would
automatically be represented on the board of directors and the articles of
association could be drafted so that there would be a minority of directors
elected by the shareholders.22 If there was any question of the need for
control by certain shareholders the company could issue a class of shares
with superior voting rights, 23 and establish different classes of shares giving
the shareholders of each category the right to elect a certain number or
24proportion of the members of the board of directors. Furthermore, joint
stock companies could be established one day and go public and be listed on
the MSM almost immediately thereafter. Thus, in the boom years of 1997
and 1998, founding shareholders could raise cash fast. These policies
encouraged companies to list securities on the MSM,25 which stimulated the
20 Mathai, supra note 8, at 60-61.
21 Commercial Companies Law, supra note 11, at art. 61. There must be at least
three founding shareholders. A single founder may not own more than 20% of the
capital in his name or in the name of his children under the age of 18. Id. at arts. 60
&61.
22 "Any person who holds at least 10% of the shares of the company shall have the
right to be a member of the Board of Directors if he so wishes. The remaining
members of the Board of Directors shall be elected from among the shareholders
who hold the minimum number of shares specified by the company's articles of
association." Id. at art. 97. If the Government owns an interest in the Company, the
Government share is represented on the board of directors by a person appointed by
Royal Decree. Id. at art. 132.23 Id. at art. 75(1).24 Id. at art. 76. The Commercial Companies Law limits the number of members on
a board to between five and twelve. Id. at art. 95.
25 For purposes of comparison, the number and value of issues listed on the MSM
during 1996 was 27 and OR 127,813 ($332,318), respectively. In 1997, the number
of listed issues increased to 37 while their value tripled to OR 373,449 ($970,967).
In 1998, the number of issues listed rose to its height of 47 and the value of these
issues increased further to OR 439,898 ($1,143,735). In 1999, the value of listed
issues plummeted more than 50%, to OR 189,346 ($492,300), with 20 listed issues
and dropped another 50% to OR 77,150 ($200,600) in 2000, with 19 listed issues.
MSM Statistics, supra note 19, at 30.
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development of a capital market. However, a capital market with certain
inherent weaknesses that would appear once the market faltered.26
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, it was common for company
heads to hold many positions. A company's chief executive officer was also
the chairman of the board of directors. The majority of the directors were
also substantial shareholders. The managers took instruction on day-to-day
affairs from the board of directors. Companies spun off subsidiaries and
established holding companies. Oman saw its own growth of conglomerates,
many of which continued to be closely-held family enterprises. With the
restrictions on a person sitting on more than five boards of directors or acting
as chairman of more than three joint stock company boards,27 these family-
held conglomerates designated relatives or other proxies to represent their
interests on boards.28  The number of related corporations coupled with
cross- or interlocking boards meant that although subject to restrictions,
fertile ground existed for related party transactions and conflicts of interest
could easily present themselves in day-to-day operations. Companies were
reluctant to comply with disclosure requirements, especially if such
disclosure would negatively impact the price of the companies' shares.29
Notwithstanding the requirement for annual general meetings, minority
shareholders in effect had no control or voice in the policies or operation of
the companies.3°  With management ineffective to sway the board of
directors,31 and with no power provided to minority shareholders, the specter
of mismanagement and misuse of power was just below the surface.
26 id.
27 Commercial Companies Law, supra note 11, at art. 95.
m See Minutes of the Meeting of H.E., the Minister of Commerce and Industry and
the Chairman of the CMA Board of Directors with the Chairmen, Executive
Presidents and General Managers of Public Joint Stock Companies, Sept. 27, 2000,
at 5 - 8 [hereinafter MCI Meeting Minutes].29 Id. at 3.30 Id. at 5-6.
31 Another factor, which is common in many countries located on the Arabian Gulf,
is that third country nationals (expatriates) fill a large number of the positions in
middle as well as upper management of companies. Although these expatriates are
generally well qualified, they are more dependent on the good will of their employer
(i.e., the company and, in effect, the substantial shareholders who are also on the
board of directors) than a native national might. For example, were they to lose their
job, they would also lose their visa that permitted them to live in the host country
and the other perquisites provided to expatriate managers, such as housing,
schooling for their children at private schools, generous leave packages, and
automobile. This factor may also contribute to a manager putting the needs of the
substantial shareholder above the needs of the company or the minority shareholders.
2003]
50 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol.3:1
During 1997 and 1998, Oman's capital market enjoyed a period of
spectacular growth. Market capitalization rose to a high of just over OR 3
billion (approximately $7.9 billion) in 1997,32 tempting new investors to
enter the market to take advantage of the riches to be acquired through share
ownership. However, in 1999 the market dropped precipitously and while
stabilized, it has yet to regain its former highs.33 Some companies sought
assistance from the government while others declared bankruptcy and were
de-listed from the MSM. 34
There are many reasons for the speculative bubble and the crisis of
confidence in Oman's capital market that eventually ruptured it. Some claim
it was caused by easy credit for investors.35 Others point out questionable
practices of company founders whereby money from an initial public
offering sometimes was used for investing in the stock market.36  In
hindsight, it is clear that whereas there were many factors that contributed to
the troubles in the capital market, a stronger system of corporate governance
likely would have protected the market from some of the excesses.
Starting in 1998, the Government of Oman began undertaking a
series of steps to ensure that a similar speculative bubble would not reoccur
and that the market would grow responsibly. One major step involved the
promulgation of the Capital Market Law, establishing the CMA, which
reports to the Minister of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI).3 7
The Capital Market Law grants to the CMA the authority to "organize,
license and monitor the issue and trading of securities [and] supervise the
operations of the MSM. ... ,3 In 2000, following the questions raised by the
public concerning the reasons behind the financial failures involving many
32 See MSM Statistics, supra note 19, at 36. The value of the bond market has been
subtracted from the market capitalization figures for all years in which there were
bonds traded on the MSM.
33 By the end of 1998, the market capitalization had dropped approximately 35%, to
OR 1,937.3 million (approximately $5,037 million). Id. As of July 2002, MSM's
market capitalization stood at OR 1,529 million (approximately $4 billion). Muscat
Securities Market, MSMNews, July 2002, at 5.
34 Revival Package, supra note 3, at 1; Companies May Have to Recast Boards,
supra note 7, at 7.
35 Mathai, supra note 8, at 61.36 See Brokerages Seek Probe, supra note 6, at 9.
37 Royal Decree No. 80/98, Establishing The Capital Market Law, at art. 46.3 8 Id. at art. 48. Prior to the establishment of the CMA, the MSM, under the Minister
of Commerce and Industry, performed the dual roles of exchange and regulator.
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listed companies, 39 the CMA issued a circular addressing corporate
governance issues by requiring audit committees, defining the role of the
internal auditor, establishing requirements for board membership, and
regulating related party transactions.40
The year 2001 brought several additional substantive changes: In
February, the CMA issued a circular urging companies either to disclose
information regarding estimates of audited or unaudited results and other
material events that would affect these results or ensure that the information
is kept confidential and that no insider trades on the basis of this information
or passes it on to others.4 ' The circular also included as an attachment
revised Rules for Disclosure, which elaborate on standards of disclosure and
requirements for audited and unaudited accounts.42 In April, the MCI issued
the Executive Regulations of the CMA, which provide guidance on the
issuance of securities and other aspects of the securities market;43 in August,
the MCI transferred to the CMA all terms of reference pertaining to the
supervision of public joint stock companies" and the CMA issued circulars
on its disclosure policy and on director qualifications and responsibilities,
and the conduct of general meetings.45 In September, the CMA adopted new
conditions for listing on the MSM.46
'9 See Brokerages Seek Probe, supra note 6, at 9. But see MCI Meeting Minutes,
supra note 28, at 1 (Minister of Commerce & Industry states that recently-issued
regulations did not come as a reaction to the decline in share prices or the
malpractice of some directors).
40 See CMA Circular (July 3, 2000) [hereinafter July 2000 Circular].41 CMA Circular No. 8/01 (Feb. 6, 2001).42 id.
43 MCI Ministerial Decision No. 4/01, issuing the Executive Regulations of the
Capital Market (Apr. 29, 2001) [hereinafter Executive Regulations].
44 See CMA Circular No. 3 1/01 (Aug. 28, 2001), at app. 1, The Terms of Reference
to be Assumed by the Authority.
45 See CMA Circular No. 29/01 (Aug. 7, 2001); CMA Circular No. 31/01, supra note
44, at app. 2-4.
46 The MSM offers three markets on which to list shares: the Regular Market, the
Parallel Market and the Third Market. In general, more established companies are
eligible to trade on the Regular Market, less established companies and established
companies no longer meeting the requirements of the Regular Market are eligible to
trade on the Parallel Market, and initial public offerings and those that do not qualify
for the Regular or Parallel Market are eligible to trade on the Third Market. CMA
Administrative Decision No. 16/01, Directives for Listing Securities on Muscat
Securities Market for the Year 2001 (Sept. 15, 2001) [hereinafter Listing
Guidelines]. Also in 2001, the MSM enabled its electronic trading system to provide
the immediate disclosure of transactions by members of board of directors of their
20031
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Most recently, the capital market saw several significant changes. In
March, the Capital Market Law was amended to provide, among other
matters, for additional disclosure and to expand the authority of the Board of
Directors of the CMA with respect to the discipline of listed companies.47 In
June, the CMA issued the Corporate Governance Code, applicable to
companies whose securities are listed on the MSM. 48 In August, Sultan
Qaboos issued the 2002 CCL Amendments, which, in particular, address
problems related to board of director composition and internal controls. 49
The Code, drawn from codes of best practices from around the world
but adapted to the local market, seeks to promote a "culture of compliance,
transparency and accountability without restraining ... business initiative." 50
Although certain standards set forth in the Corporate Governance Code have
appeared in prior circulars issued by the CMA or MCI,5' the Code pulls
many existing corporate governance standards together in one place, which
serves to highlight their importance in the eyes of the Government. The
company's shares. Muscat Securities Market, 2001 MSM Annual Report, available
at http://www.msm.gov.om/html_pages/anval-report2001.htm, at 7. In addition to
those circulars cited in notes 38 to 42, the CMA issued other important circulars
throughout the year addressing issues such as disclosure (CMA Circular No. 11/01
(Feb. 26, 2001), re Recommendations of the Technical Accounting and Auditing
Committee regarding implementation of IAS 39 and Format of Auditor's Report,
and CMA Circular No. 35/01 (Nov. 7, 2001) re Submission of Financial
Statements); related party transactions (CMA Circular No. 15/01 (Mar. 31, 2001) re
Rules for Related Party Transactions (subsequently revoked by the Code of
Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at cover letter by Yahya bin Said bin
Abdullah Al-Jabri, Executive President of the CMA [hereinafter Cover Letter], item
6.); internal controls (CMA Circular No. 23/01 (May 15, 2001) re Compliance
Officers); and procedures and notice requirements for general meetings (CMA
Circular No. 40/01 (Dec. 31, 2001) re General Meetings).
47 Palazhi Ashok Kumar, Royal Decree No. 18/02, Changes to Capital Market Law
empower, TIMES OF OMAN, Mar. 10, 2002 [hereinafter Capital Market Law
Amendments].
48 Code of Corporate Governance, supra, note 10, at art. 2.
49 Commercial Companies Law No. 4/74, supra, note 11. In addition, in February
2002, the Central Bank of Oman issued a circular on Corporate Governance of
Banking and Financial Institutions, Circular No. BM/932 (Feb. 4, 2002). The
primary purpose of that circular is to clarify the distinction in roles, responsibilities
and accountability of the board of directors and management of banks and other
financial institutions licensed by the Central Bank. The Central Bank of Oman Issues
Circular on Corporate Governance of Banking and Financial Institutions, AL-
MARKAZI, Mar. - Apr. 2002, at 5 (Cent. Bank of Oman).
50 Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at Cover Letter.
51 See, e.g., supra notes 41 - 46.
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Corporate Governance Code goes further in an effort to promote
independence of the board of directors, assure adequate internal controls,
clarify the responsibilities of the board of directors, and provide greater
protection for all stakeholders of a company. It introduces the terms "non-
executive ' 52 and "independent ' 53 directors, emphasizes the vital importance
of the role of the audit committee, replaces the rules for related party
transactions found in previous CMA circulars, and encourages companies to
adopt still higher practices of corporate governance. 54
The issuance of the Corporate Governance Code and the
promulgation of the 2002 CCL Amendments are significant steps toward
Oman's capital market achieving greater board independence and quality
corporate governance. The 2002 CCL Amendments omits the Commercial
Companies Law's requirement that substantial shareholders are
automatically entitled to a seat on the board of directors. 55 This requirement
reflected the belief that the interests of the substantial shareholders were the
same as those of the company whose shares they owned. The likely result
were boards of directors manned by unqualified individuals and the inability
of a company to achieve an independent board. Although the requirement of
representation may have been eliminated, the mindset of investors and other
members of the public will take longer to change; there are many who
believe it is only right that the substantial shareholders of a public company
exercise total control.
The 2002 CCL Amendments does not address all the issues
preventing board independence in fact it serves to hinder other corporate
52 A "non-executive" director is "one who is not a regular employee of the company
and therefore does not oversee the routine functions of the company on a daily
basis." Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at Cover Letter, item 1; see
also id. at art 1.53 A director is considered "independent" if he or she:
1. or his/her relative of the first degree has not been a key employee of the
company, its parent company, its subsidiaries or fellow subsidiaries in the last [two]
years.
2. does not have any direct or indirect material pecuniary relationship or
transaction with the company, its significant shareholders, its management, its parent
company, its subsidiary or fellow subsidiaries.
See id. at art. 1. The CMA has stated that a director may be considered an
"independent director" even if he is a substantial shareholder. Id. at Cover Letter,
item 1 The CMA has not yet clarified who would be considered a "key employee,"
or what "direct," "indirect" and "material" mean in this context.
54 See id. at Cover Letter.
55 See 2002 CCL Amendments, supra note 11, at art. 97; see also supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
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governance improvements. For example, it has not altered those provisions
of the Commercial Companies Law that permit certain interests to be
superior to those of other classes of shareholders.5 6 There is the risk that,
even if the company scrupulously follows procedures to avoid conflicts of
interest, the company will be run ultimately for the benefit of the substantial
shareholders, depriving minority shareholders of influence over decisions.
The Commercial Companies Law is in the process of being rewritten
and the draft version of the new law 57 is more balanced with respect to the
rights of shareholders. Furthermore, it does not impede the establishment of
high corporate governance standards. It is important that those provisions in
the Draft Law are not weakened prior to its promulgation.
III. A Survey of the Status of Corporate Governance in Oman
A. The Board of Directors Qualifications
In Oman, the primary qualification for board membership according
to the Commercial Companies Law has been share ownership.58 Substantial
shareholders, unless disqualified by virtue of being convicted of an offense
involving moral turpitude, and representatives of the Government of Oman
when the Government is a shareholder, must be given the opportunity to sit
on the board of directors of the company.59 Others, except "experts," who
wish to be elected to a board of directors must own the minimum amount of
shares as specified in the company's articles of association and be elected by
the shareholders at the annual general meeting.60  If permitted by the
company's articles of association, the shareholders may elect an expert but
56 See e.g., supra notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text.
57 The government is currently reviewing a draft commercial companies law
[hereinafter Draft Law], which has been drafted taking into consideration company
laws in countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Singapore and
Australia. References to the Draft Law are to the English version dated May 21,
2002.
58 In contrast, although the revised article 97 requires a person nominated to be a
director to own "a minimum number of shares as stipulated by the company's by-
laws," it does not require a substantial shareholder or his representative be given a
seat on the board. Whereas the 2002 CCL Amendments entered into effect on
October 1, 2002, the revised Article 97 is applicable to a company upon the occasion
of the first election of the board of directors thereafter.
59 Commercial Companies Law, supra note 11, at arts. 95, 97 & 132.60 Id. at arts. 96-97.
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an expert may not hold any shares in the company. 61 For every board of
directors election occurring after October 1, 2002, when the 2002 CCL
Amendments enters into effect, substantial shareholders will no longer be
automatically entitled to representation on the board of directors. To be
eligible for election, the nominated person must own a minimum number of
shares as stipulated by the company's by-laws.62  The 2002 CCL
Amendments authorizes the Minister of Commerce and Industry to stipulate
other conditions and regulations for the election of directors.63
In response to problems concerning the performance of board
members that came to light in 1999 and 2000, the CMA issued several
circulars, including, in particular, the July 2000 Circular,64 Circular No.
31/0165 and the Corporate Governance Code.66  The July 2000 Circular
established qualification requirements, such as minimum age (thirty years
old), minimum years of experience (three years) and a demonstrated ability
to contribute to the company.67 The July 2000 Circular strives for more
board independence by introducing the requirement that two non-
shareholders, presumably with relevant expertise, must be included in a
company's board of directors.68  In an effort to oversee the process,
candidates must submit their nomination for approval to the CMA in the
form prescribed by the CMA, and the CMA has the right to exclude a
candidate.69 Circular No. 31/01, with a few exceptions, reiterates the
qualification requirements of Article 95 of the Commercial Companies Law
and the July 2000 Circular.70
The Corporate Governance Code explicitly seeks boards that are
independent and board members who are ethical, intelligent, and wise,
61 Id. at art. 97. A maximum of two expert directors are permitted to be nominated
and elected as board members, in which case the number of members of the board of
directors must be increased by the number of expert directors elected. Id. This, in
effect, reduces the likelihood that the expert directors can have an impact on board
decisions. This restriction has been eliminated in article 97 of the 2002 CCL
Amendments, supra note 11.62 2002 CCL Amendments, supra note 11, at an. 97.
63 id.
64 July 2000 Circular, supra note 40.61 CMA Circular No. 31/01, supra note 44.
66 Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 10.
67 July 2000 Circular, supra note 40, at part 2, Appointment of the Board of
Directors of the Public Shareholding Companies, items 1 & 4.68 Id. at item 7.
69Id. at items 1 & 12.70 See Circular 3 1/01, supra note 44, at app. 3, items 1 & 2.
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financially literate, and assertive.7' To be considered independent, a board
must consist of a majority of non-executive directors; the roles of the chief
executive officer or general manager and chairman may not be combined;
and a minimum of one-third of the total strength of the board (subject to a
minimum of two) must consist of independent directors.72 Although the
Code of Corporate Governance does not require every board member to meet
each standard, a board member is expected to meet at least one of the
following characteristics: the ability to "motivate" people; contribute"strategic insight," and "[understand] management trends," as well as have:"expertise in ... accounting and corporate finance," the "[a]bility to perform
during periods of ... crises," "industry specific knowledge;" and, where
applicable, "expertise in international markets. 7 3
The Draft Law does not provide great detail with respect to
qualifications of boards of directors, recognizing that in matters involving the
management of a joint stock company, such details should be addressed in
the listing rules.74 The Draft Law requires that there be at least five directors
and imposes age restrictions (i.e., the minimum age for board membership is
25 years and the maximum age is 75, with certain exceptions).
B. Responsibilities of the Board of Directors
The Commercial Companies Law sets forth the basic authority of the board
of directors, which is, in essence, to perform all acts required for the
management of the company, prepare the company's balance sheet and a
profit and loss statement, and call for general meetings.76 The 2002 CCL
Amendments grants to the Minister of Commerce and Industry authority to
establish regulations regarding the responsibilities of directors.77
The primary purpose for the issuance of the July 2000 Circular was
to clarify the confusion over the respective roles and responsibilities of the
board and management. 78 The July 2000 Circular states that the board is to
play the role of policy-maker by monitoring the acts of the executive
management, developing the company's administrative and financial
71 Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at annexure 1, at 1.1.
72 Id. at arts. 3.1 - 3.3. However, as stated in the Cover Letter at item 1, a director
who is also a substantial shareholder may be considered independent.
73 See Code of Corporate Govemance, supra note 10, at annexure 1 at 1.2.1 - 1.2.7.
74 Draft Law, supra note 57, at art. 97.15.75 1d. at arts. 97.1(b), 97.3 & 97.5.
76 Commercial Companies Law, supra note 11, at arts. 102, 105 & 116.
77 2002 CCL Amendments, supra note 11, at art. 97.
78 July 2000 Circular, supra note 40, at prologue.
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regulations and appointing the internal auditor and the legal advisor.79 The
July 2000 Circular reminds board members of their responsibility to comply
with the disclosure rules of CMA.80 The board is also charged with
reviewing and approving the company's estimated budget, and discussing the
company's financial statement with the auditor.8' These requirements are
reiterated in appendix 3 of Circular 31/01.82
The Code of Corporate Governance addresses the board's
responsibilities in detail.8 3 The Code envisions that the board will support the
company's executive management and actively work to improve
management's "competence." 84 Whereas neither the non-executive board
members nor the chairman is to involve himself in day-to-day routine
matters, the board is responsible for developing policy both business and
financial, which the executive management is to put into effect.8 5 The board
also reviews the company's performance to evaluate whether the business is
properly managed according to the company's objectives."
The board adopts a system of proper internal controls to ensure
compliance with applicable laws and regulations.8 7 An important aspect of
proper internal controls is the process by which the board of directors
reviews material transactions with related parties, 88  ensures proper
disclosure89 and prevents and detects insider trading.90
79 Id. at part 2, items 3, 4 & 5.80Id. at item 7.
" Id. at items 8 & 9.
8CMA Circular No. 31/01, supra note 44, at app. 3, section 2, items 2 - 10.83 See Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at art. 5, & annex 1.
84 Id. at art.5, art. 12 & annex 1.
85 See id. at arts. 5.9 & I1 - 15. The board must approve the financial policies of the
company based on whether they meet the objectives of the business and maximize
shareholders' value. Id. at arts. 5.1 & 5.2.
86 Id. at art. 5.6.
87 Id. at arts. 5.6 & 5.9.
" The board of directors must review material transactions with related parties,
which are not in the ordinary course of business, prior to these transactions being
brought before the general meeting of the company. Id. at arts. 5.4, 5.7 & 5.8.
9 The Code states that it is the role of the board to ensure that the financial
statements, price sensitive public reports and reports to the regulators are balanced
and understandable. Id. at annex 1, item 7.
90 The Code requires every company with securities listed on the MSM to "establish,
maintain and enforce written policies, procedures and systems of supervision
reasonably designed" to ensure full and fair disclosure and prevention of insider
trading. Id. at annex 1, item 11.
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The board selects the chief executive officer or general manager and
other key executives and specifies their roles, responsibilities and power.91
It nominates the members of the subcommittees and specifies their roles,
responsibilities and power.92 The board also evaluates the functions of the
sub-committees, the chief executive officer and key employees.93 Finally, in
the annual report, the board reports to the shareholders on the status of the
company. 94
To enable the board of directors to perform its responsibilities, the
Code lists the minimum information to be made available to it. This list is
detailed, and includes financial information such as budgets and quarterly
reports; information on personnel matters, such as recruitment, resignations,
removal and remuneration of key executives; information on serious
accidents, information on regulatory matters, including non-compliance with
any requirement, pollution problems, and possible public or product liability
claims of a substantial nature; transactions involving the establishment of
joint ventures; substantial payments for intellectual property or goodwill;
information on sales of investments, assets and divisions which are not in the
normal course of business; and details of any foreign exchange exposure and
steps taken to hedge the risks.95
Thus, article 5 of the Code of Corporate Governance and the
Principles of Corporate Governance, found in annex 1 of the Code96 address
most of the concerns that have arisen regarding transparency, powers of the
board, internal controls, division of powers between management and the
board, and qualifications.
The Draft Law requires the board of directors to prepare and approve
the company's financial statements, which are to be signed on behalf of the
board by an appointed director.97  Where the board has approved the
financial statements, each director is presumed to have given his approval
unless he shows that he took all reasonable steps to prevent their approval.98
9' Id. at arts. 5.3 & 5.11.
92Id. at art 5.10.
93 Id. at art. 5.12. The board's role includes approving an organizational manual that
clearly sets forth powers and responsibilities and a comprehensive system delegating
power throughout the various levels of management, executive committee,
subcommittees of the board and the full board. Id. at art. 5.5 and annex 1, item 13.
94 Id. at art. 14.95 Id. at annex 2.
96 Id. at art. 6.
97 Draft Law, supra note 57, at art. 146.1. The financial statements are to conform to
International Accounting Standards and listing rules. Id. at art. 143.4.9' Id. at art. 146.5.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN OMAN
The board of directors of a company must also prepare an annual
Directors' Report, which is to include a review of the development of the
business, details on the assets of the company, information on directors'
interests in securities of the company and Group Company,99 and whether a
director or his or her relative received a right to subscribe, or exercised such
right, to the company's securities. 00
C. Remuneration
The Commercial Companies Law sets a ceiling for remuneration and
shareholders must vote whether to approve the amount at the general meeting
of the shareholders.10' Unless expressly provided for in the company's
articles of association, board of directors' remuneration may not exceed 10%
of the company's net annual profit, after deducting at least 5% for legal and
optional reserves and payment of dividends to the shareholders.10 2
Circular No. 3 1/01 requires that there shall be a "full" and "detailed"
disclosure of "remuneration, salaries" or "charges" of directors. 03  If
remuneration is performance-based, the company must disclose how the
performance is measured and the method of calculation.l14
The Code requires a company to develop a "transparent and credible
policy for determination of remuneration of directors and key executives,
with performance-related elements forming a significant portion of the total
remuneration package of the chief executive officer, executive directors and
key executives. 105
The Draft Law eliminates the cap on remuneration and benefits of
board members, but requires remuneration and benefits of board members be
approved by the shareholders at the general meeting and prohibits any other
payments. 1 6
99 The term "Group Company" includes a Parent Company and its Subsidiary
Undertakings. See id. at art. 3.3, for definitions of Group Company, Parent
Company, and Subsidiary Undertakings.
'00Id. at art. 147.1.a.
'01 Commercial Companies Law, supra note 11, at art. 101.
102 id.
103 Circular No. 31/01, supra note 44, at app. 3, part 1, item 14; see also July 2000
Circular, supra note 40, at part 2, item 14.
'04 Circular No. 31/01, supra note 44, at app. 3, part 1, item 14.
105 Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at annex 1, item 12.
106 Draft Law, supra note 57, at art. 98.
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D. Conflicts of Interest and Related Party Transactions
The Commercial Companies Law identifies several types of activities
constituting conflicts of interest and prohibits directors from engaging in
such activities without the prior approval of shareholders. A director may
not engage in the management of a business that is a competitor of the
company;10 7 use the company's assets for his benefit or for the benefit of
third parties; 0 8 enter, directly or indirectly, into any agreement with the
company for his account;' 0 9 or have a direct or indirect interest in any
transactions or contracts concluded by the company. "0 It is not considered
a conflict of interest where the contract or transaction is entered into
following a public tender and it is the best tender or where the company
enters into the contract with customers in the normal course of business.'
Even with shareholder approval, a person may not be a board member of
more than five joint stock companies, or a chairman of the board of more
than three joint stock companies. A person may not be a director of two
banks or two insurance companies." 2 The 2002 CCL Amendments reduces
the limit on the number of cross-board memberships from five to four and
the number of cross-chairmanships of boards of directors from three to
two. 13  It drops the limitation on bank and insurance companies
directorships. 114
The July 2000 Circular and Circular No. 31/01 address problems
concerning failure to follow procedures for related party transactions and
other conflict of interest situations, in particular cross-board and cross-
chairmanships of boards." 5 The Code of Corporate Governance prohibits
related party 116 transactions except in four circumstances:' 7
107 Commercial Companies Law, supra note 11, at art. 107. Approval must be
renewed annually. Id.'08 Id. at art. 8.
109 Id.
10 Id. at art. 108. Approval must be renewed annually. Id.
111 Id.
112 See id. at art. 95.
113 2002 CCL Amendments, supra note 11, at art. 95.
114 See id.
115 Supra notes 40 & 44. With respect to potential conflicts of interest, the July 2000
Circular prohibits the chairman of the board from being the chief executive and a
director from being an executive director in more than one company and limits a
person to serving on the board of directors of two companies engaged in the same
activity, and no more than three boards generally. One year later, Circular No.
31/01, app. 3, item 10, increased the number of boards on which a person may serve
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1. Where the transactions in question are "normal" contracts and
transactions in the "ordinary course of business." "Normal transactions"
means routine transactions carried out on a regular basis "in order to achieve
the company's objectives," without which the company's objective may not
be obtained. These transactions must be disclosed to shareholders at the next
annual general meeting.
2. Where the contract is entered into through a "transparent mode" of
open tender or limited tender after obtaining and evaluating at least three
independent bids in accordance with guidelines prescribed by the audit
committee. The best tender must be chosen. These transactions must be
disclosed to shareholders at the next annual general meeting.
3. Where the transaction has a value within the limits prescribed in
the procurement manual of the company, and is entered into in accordance
with the procedure approved by the audit committee.
from three to four. Articles 19 through 25 of the Corporate Governance Code, supra
note 10, at Cover Letter, at item 6, replace provisions in these circulars regarding
related party transactions.
116 "Related party" is defined as:
1. Any person who was [a] director ... [of] the company/parent of the
company/subsidiaries [of the company], fellow subsidiary [during
the last 12 months], or
2. Chief Executive Officer or any employee reporting directly to
the board, or
3. Any person who holds or controls 10% or more of the voting
power of the Company or ... its subsidiary ... or parent ... or ...
fellow subsidiary ... of its parent..., or
4. Any person who is an associate of any natural person as
mentioned under 1, 2, and 3 above. Associate shall include
parents, sons, daughters, spouses and business entities wherein
25% or more of the voting power is controlled collectively or
individually, or
5. Any person who is an associate of any juristic person as
mentioned under 1, 2 and 3 above. Associate shall include
parent company, subsidiaries, fellow subsidiaries and business
entities wherein the concerned juristic person controls 25% or
more of the voting power. It shall also include companies whose
majority of the directors act as per the wishes of the concerned
company.
Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at art. 1.
1 7 The Code of Corporate Governance requires that companies prepare a "works and
procurement policy" and follow it when entering into contracts and other
transactions. The works and procurement policy must be filed with the CMA. See
id. at arts. 19-21.
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4. Where the transaction, with the recommendation of the audit
committee, has prior approval by the shareholders at a general meeting of the
company."l 8 The board must provide a statement to shareholders, as part of
the notice of the annual general meeting, that the transaction in question "is
fair and reasonable so far as the interests of the shareholders of the company
are concerned." 1 9 The notice must include full details of the terms of the
transaction. 120
Any transaction entered into in violation of the guidelines set forth in
the Code is null and void. Any damages are to be borne by the concerned
related parties.' 2'
The auditors are to report on the discharge of the responsibilities of
the related party under the contract in the following year.
122
The Draft Law differentiates between the procedure followed by
directors in case of Conflicts of Interest 2 3 and Related Party Transactions.
124
Id. at art. 19. For the approval to be valid:
a. the notice to the shareholders for the purpose of obtaining prior
approval ... shall contain the following minimum details:
" [N]ame of the related party.
" Nature and extent of the interest of such party in the
transaction.
" Value of the transaction.
" Validity period of the proposed arrangement.
" Any other relevant information.
" In the case of an acquisition or disposal of assets, an
independent valuation.
" A statement by the audit committee and the board about
the suitability of the terms of the transactions.
b. The approval shall be prior to ... the execution of the transaction.
c. The approval shall not be of [a] general nature.
d. The approval shall be explicit for each transaction with full
specific details.
e. The concerned related party is not allowed to participate in the
voting.
Id. at art. 19(a)-(e).
"9 Id. at art. 20.
120 Id. It is not clear whether this article describes the notice requirement in all cases,
or just where prior shareholder approval is required.
121 Id. at art. 25.
122 Id. at art. 22.
123 A "Conflict of Interest" or "Conflicting Interest" is defined as:
[W]ith respect to a Company the Interest a Director of that Company
has respecting a matter relating to the Affairs of the Company or a
transaction effected or proposed to be effected by the Company, a
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Subject to the listing rules, a director or officer who has a Conflict of Interest
must give the board of directors notice of such interest. 125 The remaining
directors consider the matter at a meeting at which the director in question
may not attend unless required by the other directors. 12
6
Subsidiary Undertaking, a Parent Company of the Company or any
Other Entity which the Company Controls) if.
(a) whether or not the transaction or matter is (or would be) brought
before the Board of Directors of the Company for action, the
Director knows at the time that he or any of his Relatives is a party
to the transaction or has a beneficial financial Interest in, or is so
closely linked to, the transaction or matter and that it is of such
financial significance to the Director or any of his Relatives, that the
Interest would reasonably be expected to exert an influence in the
Director's judgment if he was called upon to vote on the transaction
or matter; or
(b) whether or not the transaction or matter is (or would be) brought
before the Board of Directors for action, the Director knows at that
time that any of the following is either a party to the transaction or
has a beneficial financial Interest, closely linked to the transaction or
matter and that it is of such financial significance to them, that the
Interest would reasonably be expected to exert an influence on the
Director's judgment if he were called upon to vote on the transaction
or matter:
(i) a Person ... of which the Director is a Director, Partner, agent,
employee or is in a similar position;
(ii) a Person that controls one or more of the Persons specified in
sub-clause (i) or a Person that is Controlled by or is under common
control with one or more of the Persons in sub-clause (i); or
(iii) a natural Person who is a Partner, principal or employer of the
Director.
Draft Law, supra note 57, at art- 3.3.
124 Id. at art. 112 - 117. The term "Related Party of a Company" is defined in article
115 and includes a Person who is a Substantial Shareholder; where the Substantial
Shareholder is a Company, Directors or other Officers of the Substantial
Shareholder, Relatives of Directors of the Company or a Related Company and
Relatives of the Substantial Shareholder. A Person is a "Substantial Shareholder"
for purposes of the Draft Law if "the total votes attached to Voting Shares ..., which
the Person, his Relatives or other Persons, which the first Person Controls, owns, is
5% or more of the total number of votes attached to Voting Shares in the Company."
Id. art. 226.1.
125 Id. at art. 110.1. Exceptions to the notice requirement are found in article 110.3
of the Draft Law. Id.
126Id. at art. 110.4.
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With respect to Related Party Transactions, where "a Company or
any Person which it Controls ... give(s) a Financial Benefit 12 7 to a Related
Party of the Company, the Company or such Person must" either obtain the
approval of the shareholders in accordance with Article 114 or "the giving of
the Financial Benefit must fall within an exception set out in Article 113. " 128
If the proper procedure is not followed, the transaction is voidable. 129
Shareholder approval is not needed where the transaction results
from the process of public tender and the offer of the Related Party is the
best tender, or the transaction is a usual transaction entered into in the
ordinary course of its business and the terms are no more favorable than
those offered to unrelated third parties; where "the amount of money given to
the Director or other Officer ... overtime does not exceed in aggregate the
sum of RO 1,000" ($2600) or where the Financial Benefit is given "by a
Company to a Wholly Owned Subsidiary or it; or by a Wholly Owned
Subsidiary of the Company to the Company or to a Person that the Company
Controls."' 30
The Draft Law does not conform entirely with either the Commercial
Companies Law or the 2002 CCL Amendments in that it limits the number
of cross-board memberships to four, cross-chairmanships to three, and
restricts a director from serving on more than two banks or insurance
companies boards.13'
E. Shareholder Rights
As discussed above,' 32 while the Commercial Companies Law protects the
rights of substantial shareholders, it does not provide a mechanism for
minority shareholders to exercise influence. The 2002 CCL Amendments do
away with the requirement that substantial shareholders be represented on
the board of directors but do not specifically support minority
shareholders. 133
127 The Draft Law intends that the term "Financial Benefit" be interpreted broadly.
See id. at art. 116.1(a). Article 116 lists those factors that are to be taken into
consideration when determining whether a Financial Benefit has occurred.1281Id. at art. 112.1.
12 9 Id. at art. 112.2; see also id. at art. 112.3 (stating exceptions).
30 1d. at arts. 113.1, 113.5 and 113.6; see also id. at arts. 113.1(c), 113.2, 113.3 &
113.4.
'31 Id. at arts. 101.2, 101.3 & 101.4; see supra text accompanying notes 112 - 114.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 24-32 & 59 - 60.
133 Commercial Companies Law, supra note 11; see supra text accompanying notes
55-56.
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The Draft Law permits shares in the company to be divided into
more than one class with different rights attaching to the classes.' 34  The
rights that may be different include: the right to receive dividends, the right
to subscribe to new shares, "and the right to receive notice of and the right to
participate and vote in General Meetings in person or by proxy."'135 The
Draft Law permits cumulative voting for board elections. 136
Audit Committee
The Commercial Companies Law did not require an audit committee
until the promulgation of the 2002 CCL Amendments. The 2002 CCL
Amendments require the board of directors form an audit committee in
accordance with regulations issued by the CMA. 37  The CMA first
established requirements for audit committees in 2001138 and the Code of
Corporate Governance expands on those earlier requirements. 139
The Code requires all companies to have audit committees, consisting
of at least three non-executive directors as members, the majority of whom
must be "independent directors."' 4 The chairman of the committee must be
an independent director and at least one member must have finance and
accounting knowledge.' 41 The Code requires the audit committee to meet at
least four times a year and that a majority of the independent members be
present throughout the meetings. 42 The terms of reference of the committee
identify its objectives, powers, responsibilities, liabilities and remuneration.
The audit committee must have the power to invite the finance head and head
of the internal audit department to meetings of the audit committee, to ask
134 Draft Law, supra note 57, at art. 41.
135 Id. at art. 41.2.
136 Id. at art. 97.13.
137 2002 CCL Amendments, supra note 11, art. 103. The 2002 CCL Amendments
specifically addresses the additional liability imposed on members of the Audit
Committee. Id. at art. 103 (citing article 109 of the Commercial Companies Law).
The Draft Law states that, unless exempted by the listing rules, every company must
have an audit committee appointed in accordance with, and have the duties specified
in, the listing rules. Draft Law, supra note 57, at art. 184.
138 Circular No.31/01, supra note 44, at app. 3, item 8.
139 Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at art. 7, annexure 3.
'4o Id. at art. 7(a); see supra text accompanying note 53.
141 Id. at arts. 7(b). & 7(c).
' 42 Id. at art. 7(d).
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for information from any employee, and to secure advice from outside
experts. 143
F. Internal Auditor
The 2002 CCL Amendments adds to the Commercial Companies Law
the requirement for internal auditors, appointed in accordance with the
regulations issued by the CMA. 144 Prior to now, the July 2000 Circular
imposed the requirement for internal auditors. The July 2000 Circular
requires public companies to appoint an internal auditor who is to report
directly to the chairman of the board of directors. The internal auditor is to
be familiar with accounting and have the "necessary qualifications and
expertise." Among other duties, the internal auditor is to ensure the
company's compliance with regulatory requirements and immediately report
violations thereof.145 The Code refers to the internal auditor's role in the
oversight of the audit function and review of the internal audit plan. 146
143 Id. at art. 7(f) at annexure 3 of the Code, The Role of the Audit Committee,
includes a detailed list of the responsibilities of the audit committee. The following
is a summary of those responsibilities:
1. Recommend auditors, considering, among other things, their independence
vis-A-vis their non-audit services, fee and terms of engagement.
2. Review auditors' audit plan and results and assure that auditors have full
access to all relevant documents.
3. Oversee the company's internal audit plan and results and ensure that internal
auditors have full access to all relevant documents. The audit committee may
hire consultants if necessary.
4. Approve a system to "ensure adoption of appropriate accounting policies and
principles." Look for financial fraud in the form of fictitious and fraudulent
material in the financial statement.
5. Oversee financial statements and discussion of accounting principles in annual
and quarterly financial reports, with particular attention to any "departure from
International Accounting Standards... [,] non-compliance with disclosure
requirements" and changes in accounting policies from previous years.
6. Ensure communication between board and external and internal auditors.
7. Review proposed related party transactions and establish policies for "small
value transactions" with related parties.
144 2002 CCL Amendments, supra note 11, at art. 103.
145 July 2000 Circular, supra note 40, at part 3.
146 See Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at annexure 3.
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G. Auditors
According to the Commercial Companies Law, auditors are appointed
at the annual general meeting and serve a one-year term. A company's
auditor may "not provide, regularly," the company or its affiliates with
technical, administrative or consulting services. 147
The Code of Corporate Governance provides additional procedural
detail. A company's auditor is appointed at the annual general meeting by
the shareholders upon the recommendation of the board "after considering
the views of the audit committee."' 148 The term of contract for the auditor is
one financial year, with term limits of four consecutive years. 49 The auditor
may not provide other services that may affect its independence. 50
The auditor must report to the shareholders if the auditor has concerns
of the "adequacy and efficacy of the internal control systems," the adequacy
of the procedures to ensure compliance with legal requirements applicable to
the company, and whether the company is a "going concern."'' If the
external auditor detects or suspects fraud, this must be reported to the board,
unless the fraud is "material," in which case the fraud must be reported to the
company's regulator.15
The Draft Law requires, subject to the listing rules, every public
company appoint an auditor, 5 3 appointments are for a one-year term. 54 The
auditor has the right to access the company's books and is entitled to obtain
from the company's directors and officers such information as is thought
necessary to perform the auditor's duties. Furthermore, the auditor is also
entitled to information from the company's subsidiary undertaking and its
officers. 55 The auditor may attend company general meetings and receive
all related notices. 156 The auditor is to prepare an auditor's report to the
147 Commercial Companies Law, supra note 11, art. 111. The term "regularly" is not
defined.
'"8 Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at art. 9(a).
149 Id. at art. 9(b). A firm may be reappointed after a two-year "cooling off period."
Id.
5o See id. at art. 9(c). Item I of annex 3, Role of the Audit Committee, states that
when evaluating auditors from the perspective of their independence, the audit
committee should consider their other, non-audit services.
15' Id. at art. 9(d).
12 Id. at art. 9(e).
153 Draft Law, supranote 57, at art. 167.1.
'5 4See id. at art. 168.1.
'"Id. at arts. 174.1 & 174.3.IS d. at art. 175.
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shareholders each year on the company's financial statements and comment
on whether the information given in the directors' report is consistent with
those financial statements. The auditor's report is to be in accordance with
International Auditing Standards and listing rules.1 57
H. Disclosure and Transparency
Although the Commercial Companies Law requires reporting of
semi-annual and annual financial statements, as well as directors' reports on
the company's operations for that year,1 58 it does not impose other periodic
disclosure requirements.
The Capital Market Law requires an initial prospectus when a
company goes public, with subsequent disclosure consisting of annual, semi-
annual and quarterly reports on its activities and financial results. In
addition, it requires notification of the CMA when a change or amendment to
the information provided in the prospectus occurs, a substantial shareholder
increases his ownership interests or where a person acquires 35% or more of
the securities for the purpose of dominating the company. 159
In March 2002, the Capital Market Law was amended to authorize
the CMA to issue rules requiring disclosure of "events and information that
may have an impact on their activities or financial position, any change
deemed by the Board of Directors of the [CMA] to have an impact on the
value of the security.' 160
As a result of charges that companies were not being open and
transparent, the CMA issued several circulars addressing these issues.
Chairmen of the boards of directors are required to attend the company's
annual general meeting and answer questions raised by shareholders.161
Companies are required to have procedures that enable them to disclose
"material information" in a "fair and timely" fashion and the disclosed
information must be "honest, correct, straightforward, and reasonably
complete."'162 The board must see that procedures are developed to ensure
compliance with disclosure requirements.163 As an attachment to Circular
No. 29/01, the CMA issued a Disclosure Policy Reference Paper. This
Disclosure Policy Reference Paper attempts to clarify terms such as
15 7 See id. at art. 149.
158 See Commercial Companies Law, supra note 11, at arts. 104(1) & 105.
159 Capital Market Law, supra note 37, at arts. 3, 5 & 6.
160 Capital Market Law Amendments, supra note 47, at art. 50.10.
161 July 2000 Circular, supra note 40, at part 2, item 15.
162 CMA Circular No. 29/01, supra note 45, part 1, items 1 - 2.
163 id.
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"important" and "material" information, "fair," and "timely, " as well as to
provide guidance to companies concerning what should be covered in a
company's disclosure policies.164
The Code of Corporate Governance requires companies to disclose
information that will enable shareholders to understand how the company is
being run, not just its financial status. The company must include a section
in its annual report that describes the company's corporate governance
philosophy and how the company has applied the principles of corporate
governance set forth in annex Annexure 1 of the Code; 165 it must provide
detail on each member of its board of directors, including whether he is an
executive, independent or nominee director, number of other boards or board
committees of which he is a member, and his attendance record; 166 it must
summarize the terms of reference of the audit committee and other
committees, including descriptions of their membership and their attendance
records; 67 it must provide details of remuneration and any applicable
performance criteria, to all directors and top five officers, including "salary,
benefits, perquisites, bonuses, stock options, gratuities, pensions" and
severance fees;' 68 and it must provide details regarding any penalties or
restrictions imposed on the company by the MSM, CMA, or any statutory
authority on any matter related to capital markets, within the last three
years.' 69 Finally, companies are required to include in their annual report a
section highlighting non-compliance with any requirement of the Code. 170
According to the Draft Law, in addition to disclosing matters that
may be a conflict of interest according to the law, directors must disclose
ownership interests in shares and debentures of the company, any of its
subsidiary undertakings, parent companies, or subsidiary undertaking(s) of
the company's parent company.171 There is no requirement to disclose
transactions occurring during the tenure of the director that do not result in
either the initial acquisition of shares or debentures or the termination of
164 The Disclosure Policy Reference Paper draws on standards applied in the United
States, India and United Kingdom. See id. at 1.
165 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 89, 90 & 93.
'66 Code, supra note 10, at annexure 4, item 2.
167 Id. at annexure 4, item 3.
1 Id. at annexure 4, item 5.
169 Id at annexure 4, item 6.
170 Code, supra note 10, at art. 26.
171 Draft Law, supra note 57, at art. 110.8. The Draft Law also authorizes the
company to require disclosure by shareholders of the beneficiaries of any voting
shares held by the shareholder. Id. at art. 233.
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ownership. Companies must also disclose when it grants a director the right
to subscribe for shares or debentures. 172
Directors must prepare an annual report, which includes a review of
the development of the business, details of each director's interest in the
shares or debentures of the company or any group company, whether any
rights to subscribe for shares or debentures were granted to or exercised by
the director or any relatives of his, and any other information as required by
the listing rules. 173
I. Liability, Defenses, and Enforcement
The Commercial Companies Law sets forth directors' liability where: (1)
they engage in prohibited transactions (i.e., conflicts of interest); (2) damage
the company through their acts or inaction described below; (3) engage in
insider trading; or (4) conceal the true financial position of the company. 174
A director who engages in prohibited transactions, listed below,
without the consent of the shareholders at a general meeting, shall be "liable
to the company for the profits they have gained from such violation and for
the damages arising thereof." Such transactions are voidable. 175 A director
may also be held criminally liable and subject to a fine of OR 10 to OR 5000
($26 to $13,000).176 A prohibited transaction occurs where the director:
uses[s] the company's assets or properties for their benefit or for the benefit
of third parties, or enter[s], directly or indirectly, into any agreement with the
company for their account, except for the ordinary contracts of the type
which the company concludes with its customers within the ordinary course
of its business. 177
Directors are liable "to the company, the shareholders and third
parties for the damages caused by their acts in violation of the law and their
acts which fall beyond the scope of their power or by any fraud or negligence
in the performance of their duties or by their failure to act as prudent men
172Id. at art. I10.10(c).
17 31 d. at art. 147.
174 Commercial Companies Law, supra note 11, at arts. 8, 107, 109 & 170.E.
17 Id. at art. 8.
176 Id. at art. 171.C.
177 Id. at art. 8.
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under certain circumstances."' 7 8 If more than one director is liable, each
director may be held jointly or severally liable for damages. 179
A director or any "key staff' member is also prohibited from dealing
in the company's securities while using information accessible to him
because of his position for the "achievement of a benefit" for himself or his
relatives, or from having an "interest, directly or indirectly, with any person
involved in activities intended to affect the prices of the securities issued by
the company."'1° If there is more than one director liable, each director may
be held jointly or severally liable for damages.' 8' A director or manager may
also be held criminally liable and subject to a fine of OR 10 to OR 5000
(S26-to S13,000).' 2
In these cases, as well as where there has occurred a prohibited
related party transaction or other transaction involving a conflict of interest
as described above, 8 3 either the company may bring an action against the
director or a shareholder may propose at the ordinary general meeting that
the company sue the director. If the proposal is not adopted, the
shareholder himself may bring the action on behalf of the company. 84 Any
provision limiting the liability of the members of the board of directors is
"null and void.' l8 5
A director or manager may be held criminally liable if he is found to
have intentionally included false information in financial statements or
intentionally omitted any essential fact from these documents if the result is
to conceal the true financial position of the company.'" In the case of a
criminal conviction, a director or manager is subject to a fine ranging from
78 Id at art. 109. The term "prudent man" is not defined. Article 103 of the 2002
CCL Amendments, supra note 11, states that members of the audit committee are
subject to the provisions of article 109.
'79 Commercial Companies Law, supra note 11, at art. 109.
So Id. at art. 107. "Relatives" is defined as minor children and "immediate relatives
up to the fourth degree." Id.
'8' See id at arts. 107, 109 & 110. Although both directors and key staff members
are prohibited from engaging in insider trading and manipulation of the market, the
provisions referring to damages only refer to directors, whereas the criminal
penalties affect directors and "managers."
'82 Id. at art. 171.C.
'a'Id. at art. 108.
184Id. at art. 110.
i15 Id. at art. 109.
'86 Id. at 170.E. In case of conviction, a director may be subject to a fine ranging
from OR 10 - 5000 (S26 to S13,000) or to imprisonment from three days to three
years, or to both. Id. at art. 170.
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OR 10 - 5000 ($26 - $13,000).187 The Capital Market Law imposes
penalties on directors, managers, and other employees if they engage in
insider trading, market manipulation or the intentional filing of "incorrect
statements, declarations or information" with the intention of affecting
investment decisions. 188 The penalties for these crimes are not less than one
month in jail and a fine ranging from OR 10,000 to OR 50,000 ($26,000 to
$130,000), or both.'89
The 2002 Capital Market Law Amendments authorizes the Board of
Directors of the CMA to form a Disciplinary Committee to rule on violations
by "the companies whose shares are listed on the Market."' 9" The
Disciplinary Committee may impose a caution, warning, or a fine not
exceeding OR 5000 ($13,000) on companies whose shares are listed on the
MSM.1
91
The July 2000 Circular states that board members are subject to
joint and several liability for damages caused by their acts in violation of the
law and their acts which fall beyond the scope of their powers or by any
fraud or negligence in the performance of their duties. 192 However, Circular
No. 31/01 changes the standard to joint liability, 193 which appears to conflict
with article 109 of the Commercial Companies Law.194
The Code states that any transactions in conflict with the related
party transaction provisions' 95 shall be null and void, 196 in comparison to the
Commercial Company Law, which says transactions involving conflicts of
interest are voidable. 197  Any damages are to be borne by the related
parties. 198 Companies are required to include in their annual report a section
highlighting their non-compliance with any requirement of the Code. 199 The
Draft Law has not yet elaborated on the penalties for breach in detail, 200 but it
117Id. at art. 171.
188 Capital Market Law, supra note 37, at arts. 64 & 65.
d89 1. at arts. 64-66.
190 Royal Decree 18/02, supra note 47, at art. 63A.
191 Id. These provisions do not refer to a penalty on the people as individuals, just on
the company.
192 July 2000 Circular, supra note 40, at part 2, item 1.
193 CMA Circular No. 3 1/01, supra note 44, at app. 3, item 1.
194 2002 CCL Amendments, supra note 11.195 See supra text accompanying notes 116-21.
196 Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at art. 25.
197 See Commercial Companies Law, supra note 11, at art. 8.
198 Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at art. 25.
'99 Id. at art. 26.
200 See Draft Law, supra note 57, at art. 341.
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does provide more guidance and protection to directors. Directors and
officers "must exercise their powers and discharge their duties in good faith
for a proper purpose, and must always act in the best Interests of the
Company ... with prudence, care and diligence in all of the
circumstances.' 20' Directors "who [make] a Business Judgement" 202 meet
this requirement if they:
(a) make the Business Judgment in good faith and for a
proper purpose;
(b) do not have a material personal Interest in the subject
matter of the Business Judgment;
(c) inform themselves about the subject matter of the
Business Judgment to the extent that it is appropriate in the
circumstances;
(d) rationally believe that the Business Judgment is in the
best Interests of the Company.... 203
The Draft Law adds protection for directors by permitting directors
and officers to rely on information and advice so long as that reliance is
"reasonable." The reliance is presumed to be reasonable if:
(a) he relies on information, or professional expert advice,
given or prepared by:
(i) an employee ... whom the Director or Officer
believes on reasonable grounds to be reliable and
competent in relation to the matters concerned; or
(ii) a professional adviser or expert in relation to
matters that the Director or Officer believes on
reasonable grounds to be within the Person's
professional expertise and competence; or
(iii) another Director or Officer in relation to matters
within such Director's or Officer's authority; or
(iv) a committee of Directors or Officers on which the
Director or Officer did not serve in relation to
matters within such committee's authority;"
(b) the reliance was made in good faith and after making an
independent assessment of the information or advice; and
' Id. at art. 107.1.
202 A Business Judgement means "any decision to take or not to take action" with
respect to "any matter relating to a Company." Id. at art.3.3.
203 Id. at art. 107.2.
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(c) the question of whether or not the Director or Officer was
exercising his powers or discharging his duties in
accordance with Article 107.1 in relying on the
information or advice, arises in proceedings brought to
determine whether a Director or Officer has performed a
duty under this [Draft] Law or an equivalent duty under
any other Law of Oman.2°
If the proper procedures for approving a conflict of interest
transaction are not followed, the relevant board resolution is "null and void
and any advantages secured to the Director shall be owed to the Company
and any loss incurred by the Company as a result of the Resolution shall be
made good by the Director., 20 5 With respect to a related party transaction, if
the proper procedure is not followed the transaction is voidable.20 6
Directors and officers are responsible for actions taken by others
pursuant to a delegation of power, duty, or responsibility. They are not
responsible for improper actions of the delegate so long as they "believed: (i)
on reasonable grounds; (ii) in good faith; and (iii) after making proper
inquiry, (if circumstances indicated the need for inquiry), that the delegate
was reliable and competent in relation to the power delegated., 20 7
The Draft Law prohibits a director or officer from improperly using
his position to gain advantage for himself or "someone else" or causing
"detriment" to the company20 8 and improperly using information obtained
because of his position to gain an advantage for himself or another person
209
or otherwise causing "detriment" to the company. 210
The directors and officers must compensate the company, its
shareholders, and third parties "for any losses caused to them by any breach
or failure to comply with the provisions of [the Draft Law] by such Directors
2041d. at art. 108.
201 Id. at art. 110.5.
206 Id. at art. 112.2; see also id. at art. 112.3 (noting exceptions).
201 Id. at art. 109.
208 Id. at art. 107.3. This provision is broader than that set forth in article 107 of the
Commercial Companies Law, supra note 11, because, instead of being limited to
certain relatives, it applies to a more general "someone else."
209 A "Person" can be either a natural or juristic person. Draft Law, supra note 11, at
art. 3.3.
210 Id. at art. 107.4. This clause is also broader than that found in article 107 of the
Commercial Companies Law in that it applies to both current and past directors and
officers who because of that position obtain and use the information.
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or Officers, or by any acts or omissions that are beyond the scope of the
authority of such Directors or Officers.",211
In the event the company enters into the insolvency process, and if
the receiver or liquidator or other administrator forms the opinion that a
director has, among other acts, breached any duty owed to the company, then
a motion may be made to the court to require the director to "make any
contributions to the company's assets that the court thinks proper in the
circumstances."2 12
The Draft Law provides that an officer may use as a defense against
any claim made under the Draft Law evidence that he took all "reasonable
steps in the circumstances." 213 The "reasonableness of such steps shall be
determined by reference to the nature and extent of the obligation which it is
alleged such Officer failed to comply with." 214
Although the Corporate Governance Code institutes many important
requirements, it is not evident from the text of the Code how the CMA plans
to enforce the provisions of the Code and to what extent it will rely on
voluntary compliance. The Code requires shareholders be informed in a
section of the annual report of the composition and independence of board
members and the company's efforts on corporate responsibility. The report
must highlight areas in which the company is not in compliance. 215
IV. Conclusions, Recommendations and Comments
Oman is well on the way to implementing a model corporate
governance system for its capital market. The Code of Corporate
Governance incorporates many important measures, which will provide
greater transparency, director responsibility, and independence of the board.
The latest revisions to the Commercial Companies Law, by eliminating the
right of substantial shareholders to seats on the board, eliminate a major
hurdle to achieving board independence. The adoption of a new Commercial
Companies Law, substantially similar to the draft currently under
consideration, will facilitate the CMA's efforts to institute a high standard of
corporate responsibility and related accountability. These are significant
achievements in a relatively short period of time, yet there are other
211 Id. at art. 107.5.
212 Id. at art. 338.
213 Id. at art. 343. The Draft Law includes directors in the definition of the term
"officer." See id. at art. 3.3.
214 Id. at art. 343.
215 Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at arts. 26 & 27.
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measures that could be considered to advance improved corporate
governance.
In Oman, it is the government regulator, rather than the exchange,
that promulgates listing standards. By stating that the listing rules govern in
certain instances,21 6 the Draft Law acknowledges that companies with
securities listed on the MSM should be held to a different standard than
privately held companies and that the CMA is the appropriate institution to
determine that standard. By including corporate governance standards in
listing rules, the CMA can not only be more flexible and amend the listing
rules as it identifies problems, but can wield a potent enforcement
mechanism: the threat of delisting. The Listing Guidelines currently
establish entry requirements for companies wishing to list their securities on
the MSM.2 17 These entry requirements focus primarily on the size and
strength of the company to determine on which level of the market (i.e.,
Regular, Parallel or Third Market) the company's securities should be traded,
rather than on other substantive issues, now addressed in the Code of
Corporate Governance and other circulars, that are important for ensuring the
quality of ongoing operations of the companies themselves as well as the
reputation of the MSM. 218 Even before the Draft Law is promulgated, the
CMA could incorporate, either directly or by cross-reference, many or all of
the provisions of the Code of Corporate Governance and other ongoing
disclosure requirements into its Listing Guidelines, thereby tying non-
compliance with the Code to the threat of de-listing or relegation to a lower
rung of the trading markets on the MSM.
A. Boards of Directors
The 2002 CCL Amendments moves Oman in the right direction by
eliminating the correlation between substantial share ownership and board
membership. The 2002 CCL Amendments gives the Minister of Commerce
and Industry the authority to establish regulations regarding the authority of
boards of directors. The Minister should use this authority to formalize and
thereby add more regulatory weight to the provisions found in the Code of
Corporate Governance.219
Although the CMA in its Code of Corporate Governance goes far in
promoting independence of the board, it stopped short when it concluded that
216 See, e.g., Draft Law, supra note 57, at arts. 11.1, 13.3, 20.3, & 76.1.
217 See supra text accompanying note 46.
218 id.219 See supra text accompanying notes 77, 83-96.
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until such time as the director who is also a substantial shareholder is
involved in a material transaction with the company, he can be considered an
"independent" director.2 0 Whether or not the substantial shareholder can be
objective in performing his role as a director should not be the dispositive
issue. Just as important is the value that attaches to a market that is seen to
avoid even the appearance of impropriety. This is especially true in Oman
where substantial shareholders are often the founding shareholders, are likely
to be controlling shareholders and in any event are assumed by many to have
a more personal interest and influence in the affairs of the company even if
they are not part of management. If this interpretation of the Code stands,
the two independent directors who are required by the Code of Corporate
Governance to serve on the audit committee, as well as the audit committee's
chairman, could be substantial shareholders.221 The audit committee is
charged with many important functions, such as the approval process for
related party transactions. 222 It is not enough that the Code does not permit
the members of this committee to be part of management. 3 They should
also not be substantial shareholders. Furthermore, the Draft Law should
incorporate provisions requiring a minimum number of truly independent
board members serve on boards and certain committees, such as the audit
committee.
The Draft Law appears to raise the standard of responsibility of
individual board members for the accuracy of a company's financial
statements by stating that all members are presumed to have approved the
financial statements unless they can show that they took "reasonable" steps
to prevent their approval.224 Although this does not appear to go so far as to
require the board to "certify" the financial statements, it does seem to impose
a higher duty to inquire deeply into the details of what they are approving,
which should lead to increased investor confidence. Furthermore, both
directors and officers are subject to personal liability for losses to the
company, its shareholders and third parties caused by their breach of or
o See supra text accompanying note 53.
221 Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at arts. 7(a) & 7(b).
2i Id. at art. 19. The audit committee also is charged with, for example, oversight of
the internal audit and internal control functions. Id. at annexure 3, items 4 & 5.223 See id. at art 7(a).
2 See supra text accompanying notes 97 & 98. It is noteworthy that in Oman it
would be the directors who are asked to approve the statements whereas in the
United States it is the chief executive officer or chief financial officer. This may be
in recognition of the fact that, in Oman, the board continues to have as great as if not
greater influence in the operation of the company and knowledge of the facts than
management.
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failure to comply with the provisions of the Draft Law or by any of their acts
or omissions beyond the scope of their authority.225
It appears that the Draft Law would relax the existing provisions on
board remuneration. Whereas the Commercial Companies Law imposes a
cap on remuneration and Circular No. 31/01 and the Code of Corporate
Governance require disclosure and a credible policy for establishing
remuneration, respectively, the Draft Law merely requires that the
226remuneration be approved by shareholders at the general meeting.
Although it is appropriate that shareholders be required to approve the
remuneration package and that no other remuneration is permitted, the CMA
should be aware of trends in compensation and whether some forms of
compensation are going unreported. The CMA should periodically examine
executives' and directors' compensation packages in Oman in order to
understand compensation trends, such as the amount or value of the different
forms of compensation, the extent to which stock options are utilized and, if
so, how such stock options are treated on the books of the company. The
CMA should be aware of alternate forms of remuneration, such as the
granting of low interest loans to board members and executives so as to
determine whether such forms should be either disclosed or prohibited.
Whether or not remuneration is seen to be a problematic issue in
Oman, it may be appropriate to lay the groundwork for regulation in this
area, either by stating in the Draft Law that the issue of remuneration may be
dealt with in the Listing Rules or by specifically including in the Draft Law
parameters on the purposes of and types of compensation (e.g., benefits,
stock options, cash, other perks), amount of compensation, and the basis of
calculation of compensation if performance-related, and establishing the
approval and disclosure requirements.
Although the Draft Law does not address the issue, it is apparent by
the fact that cross-board memberships is referred to in the Commercial
Companies Law, several subsequent circulars, and the 2002 CCL
Amendments, that the issue of how many and what types of cross-board
memberships should be permitted is of concern in Oman.227 Cross-board
memberships create potential conflicts of interest, especially in a small
capital market. If interlocking boards are also prevalent, there is even greater
danger of conflicts of interest and related party transactions. Also, it takes
time to do a good job as a director. It is not in the best interests of a
company to have as a director someone who is over-committed. Therefore,
225 See supra text accompanying note 211.
226 See supra text accompanying notes 101-06.
227 See supra text accompanying notes 112 & 115.
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it is reasonable to impose a limitation on board memberships in the case of
companies whose securities are listed on the MSM. Although the 2002 CCL
Amendments provide the most recent determination on the limits of cross-
board membership,2 8 it may be best to provide in the Draft Law that the
Listing Guidelines address this issue. This change would grant more
flexibility to address changing conditions in the capital market. Although
the Draft Law, like the 2002 CCL Amendments, permits the possibility that
substantial shareholders will not control the board, it continues to permit
companies to control which shareholders have the right to vote on issues that
the law says must be approved by shareholders through the creation of
different classes of shares.229 This poses the question as to why Oman
considers it necessary to grant voting rights to the shareholders of one class
of shares while denying voting rights to those holding another class of
shares? What type of shareholder is the provision designed to protect? In
some countries foreigners are permitted to buy only non-voting shares in
order to protect the local shareholders. In other countries, the restriction is
permitted so that the founding shareholders can prevent others from affecting
policy. The CMA should seriously consider whether it is in the best interest
of the capital market to allow a listed company to issue shares that do not
permit shareholders of such shares to vote. If it is deemed appropriate that
certain types of companies should be permitted to create different classes of
shareholders with unequal voting rights, is it really necessary to extend the
right to all types of companies?
B. Audit Committee
It is important that the provisions in the 2002 CCL Amendments
regarding audit committees be incorporated into the final version of the Draft
Law.230  The Listing Guidelines should include the audit committee
requirements similar to those currently found in the Code of Corporate
Governance. 23' Having the requirements for audit committees in the Listing
Guidelines will give the CMA flexibility if the need arises in the future to
adjust the requirements.
228 2002 CCL Amendments, supra note 11, at art. 95.
229 Draft Law, supra note 57, at art. 41230 2002 CCL Amendments, supra note 11, at art. 103; see also supra text
accompanying notes 137- 43.
231 See supra text accompanying notes 140 - 43.
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C. Internal Auditor
The role of an internal auditor is important, especially for publicly-
traded companies. As permitted by the 2002 CCL Amendments, the Listing
Guidelines should set forth minimum requirements for internal auditors
along the lines of those currently set forth in the July 2000 Circular and the
232Code of Corporate Governance.
D. Auditors
The Draft Law addresses an important issue by clearly stating that
auditors are entitled to obtain information.233 It may be reasonable to
incorporate additional provisions, already found in the Commercial
Companies Law and circulars, given what other authorities have found
recently. For example, the Draft Law states that the auditor's term is one
year.3 Because it is not specifically addressed, it is assumed that the
auditor may be elected for subsequent terms and there are no term limits.
The Code of Corporate Governance provides for one-year terms and a term
limit of four consecutive years.235 Although it is true that auditors may not
note some problems until the second year of their term, it is also true that
periodic changes in auditors may serve to identify areas that have gone
unquestioned. On the other hand, commentators have pointed out that it is
illogical to require companies to terminate an auditing relationship without a
reason, especially since there are now fewer auditors in business from which
to choose.236
The second issue is whether to permit the auditor to provide other
consultancy services. The Commercial Companies Law prohibits auditors
from providing on a "regular" basis other services to the company.237 The
Code of Corporate Governance prohibits an auditor from providing "non-
audit" services that "might affect their independence" to the company.238
The Draft Law is silent on the issue. The issue of whether or not a
company's auditors may also act as the company's consultants is important.
It should be determined which types of consulting services are inappropriate,
232 See supra text accompanying notes 144 - 46.
233 Draft Law, supra note 57, at arts. 177-78.
234 See id. at art. 168. 1.
235 Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at art. 9(b).
236 See, e.g., Jim Peterson, Rotating Auditors Doesn't Add Up, INTERNATIONAL
HERALD TRIBUNE, Aug. 31 - Sept. 1, 2002, at 15.
237 2002 CCL Amendments, supra note 11, at art. 111.
238 Code of Corporate Governance, supra note 10, at art. 9(c).
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allowing the remaining services to be provided with appropriate limitations,
if determined necessary. Although this issue does not necessarily have to be
addressed at the level of law, instead being covered in the Listing Guidelines,
it may be that Oman would want to take a stand on this issue at the highest
level as is now being considered in other countries.
E. Disclosure and Transparency
As noted above, the Commercial Companies Law requires
companies to report financial statements annually and semiannually, but does
not require other periodic reporting.239 The Capital Market Law requires an
initial prospectus when a company goes public, with subsequent disclosure
consisting of annual, semiannual and quarterly reports on its activities and
financial results. Notification of the CMA is required when information
provided in the prospectus changes, where certain changes of share
ownership occurs and where events and information that may have an impact
on their activities or financial position occur.240 The Draft Law requires
annual financial statements and certain other disclosure. 24' Other specific
disclosure requirements are set forth in circulars. 24 -
Although the CMA has relied upon the general authority set forth in
article 6 of the Capital Market Law when requesting companies to submit
information,243 the authority of the CMA to require disclosure of relevant
data or information on a regular or periodic basis should be specifically
addressed in either the Commercial Companies Law or in the Capital Market
Law. Assuming that the Code of Corporate Governance is incorporated into
the Listing Guidelines as recommended above, the Listing Guidelines should
be further revised to incorporate other regular or periodic disclosure
requirements.
F. Liability, Defenses and Enforcement
The Capital Market Law lays a basic foundation for the regulation of
the capital market in Oman, but more detail might be desirable both at the
level of law and at the level of Executive Regulations. Thus far, many issues
239 See supra text accompanying note 158.240 See supra text accompanying note 159.
241 See supra text accompanying notes 171 -73.
242 See supra text accompanying notes 161 - 70.
243 Capital Market Law, supra note 37, at art. 6 (reading as follows: "The company
and the auditors must provide the [CMA] with all information requested .. ")
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are addressed in circulars, in particular as they relate to disclosure, and it is
unclear whether the standards set forth in the circulars are mandatory or
serve merely as guidance. As the capital market develops, the regulatory
framework should be as precise as practicable to avoid ambiguities and
misinterpretation by both local and foreign investors. In addition, without
certainty there can be claims of selective enforcement of regulations, which
leads to distrust of the regulators and the market.
As corporate governance standards are improved and directors and
officers are held to higher standards, it is important that the Draft Law has
incorporated a Business Judgment Rule and provides guidance concerning
when reliance on information and advice would be considered to be
"reasonable. ,2 44
Finally, as is the case in many jurisdictions, without the will and the
proper means to enforce existing laws and regulations, there is little reason to
adopt more, even arguably better, regulations. Oman has shown that it will
prosecute board members in egregious cases. 245 However, all companies
need to know that they will be held to high standards; that they must comply
with the rules of the game in order to play. The annual reports published in
2003 will give a very good indication of the extent of compliance with the
new corporate governance requirements. The manner in which the CMA
reacts to those not fully complying will set the tone for the coming years.
244 See supra text accompanying notes 201 - 04.
245 See, e.g., [Four] Jailed for Breach of Trust and Fraud, supra note 2, at 1 (four
board members and employees of Oman National Investment Holding SAOG
convicted for crimes involving breach of trust, fraud, and manipulating the market).
